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China’s Water Woes: Past, Present, and Future
February 12, 2009 in China Behind the Headline, Global China by The China Beat | 1 comment

The Chinese droughts have just begun to move onto the front pages of the world’s newspapers, but
the droughts are just the latest sign of much more dire warnings of water woes in China. Some China
experts are talking about this (see, for instance, today’s event at the Wilson Center on “Temperatures
Rising: Climate Change, Water, and the Himalayas“), but, in China Beat fashion, we’re hoping to
encourage many more people to do a little more reading and talking about it too, so we invited Ken
Pomeranz to reflect on the present news and suggest a few further readings for those who are
interested.
By Ken Pomeranz
Water is back in the China-related news lately – and that’s almost always a bad sign. Most recently,
we have had stories about the grinding North China drought; this may be the worst since the late 50s
drought that exacerbated the Great Leap Forward famine. A bit earlier, we had the report of credible
(though unproven) research suggesting that last May’s catastrophic Sichuan earthquake may have
been triggered by pressure from the water stored behind Zipingpu Dam. (Seehere for an early report,
and then the slightly later piece, with more about the key Chinese scientist involved, by Evan Osnos of
the New Yorker). Late in January, Jiang Gaoming of the Chinese Academy of Sciences released a
sobering piece (China Dialogue, January 22, 2009) about how accelerating the construction of dams in
China’s Southwest – part of the P.R.C.’s ambitious stimulus package to fight the global recession – is
worsening the already considerable environmental and social risks involved, with some projects
beginning before any Environmental Impact Assessments have been completed. Such a confluence of
events is enough to make a historian think back…to about six weeks ago.
When the China Beat crew decided to put together our book China in 2008, I drew what you could
consider either the long or the short straw, depending on your tastes: light editorial duties in return
for writing an “end of the year wrap-up” piece to go at the end of the book. (Most of the copy had to
go to the press by November 1, and a book with the sub-title “10 months out of a year of great
significance” somehow didn’t seem right.) And as the last days of the year ticked off and I tried to
figure out what things about 2008 to emphasize, water kept winding up at the center. Here’s an
excerpt:
“The Olympics briefly focused attention on China’s serious air pollution problems…But China’s water
woes are at least equally pressing, and it may be easier to see what effects they will have. Two littlenoted news items from near the end of the year may illuminate that – after we review some
background.
Water has always been a problem in China, and effective control of it has been associated with both
personal heroism and legitimate sovereignty for as far back as our records go…. But water scarcity is
probably an even greater problem than excesses, especially in the modern period. Surface and nearsurface water per capita in China today is roughly ¼ of the global average, and worse yet, it is
distributed very unevenly. The North and Northwest, with over half the country’s arable land, have
about 7 percent of its surface water; the North China Plain, in particular, has 10 to12 percent of the
per capita supply for the country as a whole, or less than 3 percent of the global average. China also
has unusually violent seasonal fluctuations in water supply; both rainfall and river levels change much
more over the course of the year than in either Europe or North America. While the most famous of
China’s roughly 85,000 dams are associated with hydro-power (about which more in a minute), a
great many exist mostly to store water during the peak flow of rivers for use at other times of year.
The People’s Republic has made enormous efforts to address these problems – and achieved
impressive short-term successes that are now extremely vulnerable. Irrigated acreage has more than
tripled since 1950, with the vast majority of those gains coming in the North and Northwest; this has
turned the notorious “land of famine” of the 1850-1950 period into a crucial grain surplus area, and
contributed mightily to improving per capita food supplies for a national population that has more than

doubled. Much of that, however, has come through the massive use of deep wells bringing up
underground water far faster than it can be replaced; and a great deal of water is wasted, especially in
agriculture, where costs to farmers are kept artificially low. (Chinese agriculture is not necessarily
more wasteful in this regard than agriculture in many other places – and certainly the deviations from
market prices are no worse than in the supposedly market-driven United States – but its limited
supplies make waste a much more immediate problem.) Water tables are now dropping rapidly in
much of North China, and water shortages are a frequent fact of life for most urban residents. (Beijing
suffers fewer water shortages, but only because it can commandeer the water resources of a large
surrounding rural area included in the municipality.) Various technologies that would reduce water
waste exist, but most are expensive. More realistic pricing of irrigation water would help – but
probably at the price of driving millions of marginal farmers to the wall, and greatly accelerating the
already rapid rush of people to the cities. Consequently, adoption of both of these palliatives is likely
to remain slow.
Instead, the state has chosen a massive three-pronged effort to move water from South to North
China – by far the biggest construction project in history, if it is completed. Part of the Eastern section
began operating this year, and the Central section is also underway (though the December 31 Wall
Street Journal reported a delay due to environmental concerns). The big story in the long run,
however is the Western line, which will tap the enormous water resources of China’s far Southwest –
Tibet alone has over 30 percent of China’s fresh water supply, most of it coming from the annual runoff of some water from Himalayan glaciers. (This is an aspect of the Tibet question one rarely hears
about, but rest assured that all the engineers in China’s leadership, including Hu Jintao and Wen
Jiabao, are very much aware of it. Tibetans, meanwhile, not only see a precious resource going
elsewhere when their water is tapped: they regard many of the lakes and rivers to be dammed as
sacred.) The engineering challenges in this mountainous region are enormous, but so are the potential
rewards, both in water supply and in hydropower – the electricity water can generate is directly
proportional to how far it falls into the turbines, and the Yangzi, for instance, completes 90 percent of
its drop to the sea before it even enters China proper. The risks, as our two stories make clear, are
social and political as well as environmental…
Call the two news stories the “double glacier shock.” On December 9,Asia Times Online reported that
China was planning to go ahead with a major hydroelectric dam and water diversion scheme on the
great bend of the Yarlong Tsangpo River in Tibet. The hydro project is planned to generate 40,000
megawatts – almost twice as much as Three Gorges. But the water which this dam would impound
and turn northwards currently flows south into Assam to form the Brahmaputra, which in turn joins
the Ganges to form the world’s largest river delta, supplying much of the water to a basin with over
300 million inhabitants. While South Asians have worried for some time that China might divert this
river, the Chinese government had denied any such intentions, reportedly doing so again when Hu
Jintao visited New Delhi in 2006. But when Indian Prime Minister Singh raised the issue again during
his January, 2008 visit to Beijing, the tone had changed, with Wen Jiabao supposedly replying that
water scarcity is a threat to the “very survival of the Chinese nation,” and providing no assurances.
And so it is – not only for China, but for its neighbors. Most of Asia’s major rivers – the Yellow, the
Yangzi, the Mekong, Salween, Irrawaddy, Brahmaputra, Ganges, Sutlej, and Indus – draw on the
glaciers of the Himalayas, and all of these except the Ganges have their source on the Chinese side of
the border.Forty-seven percent of the world’s people, from Karachi to Tianjin, draw on those
rivers.
In short the possible damage to China’s neighbors from this approach to its water and energy needs is
staggeringly large – and the potential to raise political tensions is commensurate. Previous water
diversion projects affecting the source of the Mekong have already drawn protests from Vietnam (and
from environmental groups), and a project on the Nu River (which becomes the Salween in Thailand
and Burma) was suspended in 2004. But this project has vastly larger implications for both Chinese
and foreigners. If, as some people think, the twenty-first century will be the century of conflicts over
water, Tibet may well be ground zero.
Of course, China is hardly the only country that has ever appropriated water (not to mention other
resources) that others see as theirs; I am writing in Southern California, made much more livable by
denying Mexico Colorado River water it is theoretically guaranteed by treaty. And there is also

something to be said, environmentally, for anything that provides China with lots of electricity and
isn’t coal…
But that’s where the second glacier shock of 2008 comes in – news that this crucial water source is
disappearing faster than anyone had previously realized. A report published in Geophysical Research
Letterson November 22 noted that recent samples taken from Himalayan glaciers were missing two
markers that are usually easy to find, reflecting open air nuclear tests in 1951-2 and 1962-3. The
reason: the glacier apparently had lost any ice built up since the mid-1940s…And since the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates that the Himalayan highlands will warm at about
twice the average global rate over the next century, there is every reason to think the situation will
get worse. One estimate has 1/3 of the Himalayan glaciers disappearing by 2050, and 2/3 by 2100. If
that scenario is right, then even if all the engineering challenges of South-North water diversion can
be solved, and even if China undertakes and gets away with taking water away from hundreds of
millions of people in South and Southeast Asia, the resulting fix might not last very long…”
Strangely, these stories have attracted very little press coverage. There is, however, an excellent
video at the Asia Society website. And there is a fair amount of stuff that’s worth reading about
China’s water problems in general. If you are interested in learning more, here are a few things I
would recommend:
1. James Nickum has a nice, short, summary of the South-North water transfer project available
online. His December 1998 essay in China Quarterly, “Is China Living on the Water Margin?” (#156,
880-898) seems to me to have held up very nicely for a 10-year old overview of this rapidly changing
set of problems (and as regular readers of this blog know, we give extra points for punning titles).
2. Another useful overview from several years ago (more technical than Nickum’s) is Olli Varis and
Pertti Vakkilainen “China’s 8 challenges to water resources management in the first quarter of the 21st
Century,” Geomorphology 41:2/3 pp. 93-104 (November 15, 2001). If you’re at a place where you
can access the web version (i.e., a library with a subscription), you’ll find lots of useful further links to
click on. (Here is one link for those with a subscription through ScienceDirect.)
3. Elizabeth Economy’s The River Runs Black seems to me to overstate the problems at some times
(and since I don’t have a sanguine view, that should give an idea how, umm, black, her take is), but
it’s a very good introduction to some of the relevant policy-making agencies and processes.
4. Dai Qing’s various essays on Three Gorges and other hydro projects are very useful, as is the
collection Mega-Project (which included both official and unofficial views of the project).
5. Probe International often has good material, as does the International Rivers project.
6. And since plugging oneself is OK on a blog, I have a long-ish essay on the history of Chinese water
management in a forthcoming collection of essays on environmental history: Burke, Edmund III, and
Kenneth Pomeranz, editors The Environment and World History (UC Press, forthcoming March, 2009).
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